#### Networks on Cake Cutting

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### Cake Cutting

The general cake-cutting problem:

#### What we have:

- A cake , represented by interval  $\mathcal{C} = [0, 1]$ .
- Player set  $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$  (represented by [n]).
- Valuation functions for each player,  $v_i : \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{C}) \rightarrow [0, 1] \quad \forall i \in N.$
- Our assumptions for each v<sub>i</sub> Additive and Divisible.
- Additive -

 $\forall X, Y \subseteq \mathcal{C}, v_i(X \cup Y) + v_i(X \cap Y) = v_i(X) + v_i(Y)$ 

- Divisible - $\forall X \subseteq C, \lambda \in [0, 1], \exists Y \subseteq X \text{ s.t. } v_i(Y) = \lambda v_i(X)$
- Furthermore, we assume each  $v_i$  is normalized, i.e.  $v_i(\mathcal{C}) = 1$ .

### Cake Cutting

#### What we want:

- An allocation {A<sub>1</sub>,..., A<sub>n</sub>} (a partition of C) that, either exactly or approximately, establishes some notion of *fairness*.
- Possible criterion for fairness Envy-Freeness, Proportionality.
- Envy-Freeness - $\forall i, j \in N, v_i(A_i) \ge v_i(A_i)$
- Proportionality -∀ i ∈ N, v<sub>i</sub>(A<sub>i</sub>) ≥ 1/n
- We will mainly focus on envy-freeness.

#### Networks

- **The problem**: Defining a global fairness criterion is often overly restrictive and hard to obtain. Most practical scenarios involve allocating over some social or institutional network.
- The problem we studied involved imposing a network structure over *N* and then studying fair cake-cutting. This graphical framework was first proposed in [BQZ17].
- In networked fairness, an agent *i* is only concerned about *local fairness*, i.e. fairness w.r.t his neighbours N(*i*) in the network.
- Envy-Freeness (in network)  $\forall j \in N(i), v_i(A_i) \ge v_i(A_j)$
- Proportionality (in network)  $v_i(A_i) \ge \sum_{j \in N(i)} v_i(A_j) / |N(i)|$

An important observation: An allocation that is envy-free over a graph G, will also be envy-free over any subgraph G' of G. (The same cannot be said for proportional allocations)

#### Existing results

- *Discrete* and *bounded* algorithms for normal envy-free division for 4 agents<sup>1</sup> and *n* agents<sup>2</sup>. By our previous observation, this means we already have an algorithm for envy-freeness over any network.
- However, these algorithms require a large number of queries and cuts: the 4-agent algorithm can go upto 203 cuts, and the general algorithm has  $O(n^{n^{n^n}})$  queries.
- Thus, it is necessary to focus on simpler and more efficient algorithms for fairness over networks with special properties.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>AM16b.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>AM16a.

#### Austin Cut

- This leads us to the Austin Cut algorithm.
- A continuous, moving-knife procedure.
- Given: (*i*, *j*, *m*, *C*), where *i*, *j* are players, *m* ∈ ℕ, and *C* is some cake portion.
- AustinCut(i, j, m, C) partitions C into m parts, s.t. for every piece P,  $v_i(P) = v_i(C)/m$  and  $v_j(P) = v_j(C)/m$  both hold.
- Requires atmost 2*m* cuts. However, the drawback is of course, that it is continuous. It's currently unknown if this can be implemented by a discrete algorithm.
- [BQZ17] utilizes Austin Cut to give fair and efficient algorithms for *tree networks* and *descendant graph networks*.

#### Austin Cut-2 Players, k equal pieces

WLOG, we'll assume C represents C.

- *i* marks C into m equal pieces (according to  $v_i$ ).
- **2** If there is a piece A s.t.  $v_j(A) = 1/k$ , take A and stop.
- Solution Else there are adj. pieces A, B s.t.  $v_j(A) < 1/k$  and  $v_j(B) > 1/k$ .
- *i* can keep k knives/pointers starting at *A*, and move them towards *B* in such a way that the portion bet. them always has  $v_i$  value = 1/m.
- **3** By IVT, *j* will find a portion *P* bet. the knives at some point s.t.  $v_j(P) = 1/m$  too. Take *P* and stop.
- **6** Repeat steps 2-5 until *m* pieces are obtained.











### Tree algorithm [BQZ17]



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### Tree algorithm [BQZ17]



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#### EXTENSION: Tree with an additional edge at level 1



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### Brams-Taylor-Zwicker procedure

- Global envy-free cake cutting among 4 players [BTZ97]
- Non-discrete algorithm since it uses Austin cut as a sub-procedure.
- 13 cuts are required. (Can be optimized to 11)
- 1: AustinCut(1, 2, 4, C)
- 2: Trim(3) ▷ Player 3 creates two-way tie for largest piece
- 3: ChooseOrder(4, 3, 2, 1,  $C \setminus \{trimming\} \} \triangleright$  Either 3 or 4 chooses trimmed piece
- 4: if trimmed piece  $\rightarrow$  3 then
- 5: AustinCut(4, 1, 4, trimming) ▷ trimming = smaller trimmed piece (w.r.t. 3)
- 6: ChooseOrder(3, 2, 4, 1, trimming)
- 7: **else**
- 8: AustinCut(3, 1, 4, trimming)
- 9: ChooseOrder(4, 2, 3, 1, trimming)

10: end if

#### Structures

- Cycles(length: 5, 6)
- Cliques connected via a Bridge (clique with 3 vertices)
- Other Miscellaneous Structures

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### Cycle $(C_5)$



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# Cycle $(C_5)$



Τ1













# Cycle $(C_5)$



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#### Cycle General

Similar procedure



#### Cycle General



#### Cycle General



Generalize to N length cycles?

#### Structures

- Cycles(length: 5, 6)
- Cliques connected via a Bridge (clique with 3 vertices)
- Other Miscellaneous Structures

### Clique connected via a Bridge (clique with 3 vertices)



Cake: P

#### Clique connected via a Bridge (clique with 3 vertices)



P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6 = AustinCut (A, D, P, 6)

#### Clique connected via a Bridge (clique with 3 vertices)



P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6 = AustinCut (A, D, P, 6)



# Clique connected via a Bridge (clique with 3 vertices)



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#### Clique connected via a Bridge (clique with 3 vertices)



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#### Clique connected via a Bridge (clique with 3 vertices)



Case 1: Top preference of E and F among remaining different

# Clique connected via a Bridge (clique with 3 vertices)



Case 1: Top preference of E and F among remaining different





# Clique connected via a Bridge (clique with 3 vertices)



Case 2: Top preference of E and F among remaining same, but second best preference different









#### Clique connected via a Bridge (clique with 3 vertices)



Case 3: Top two preference of E and F among remaining same

### Clique connected via a Bridge (clique with 3 vertices)



#### Case 3: Top two preference of E and F among remaining same

# Clique connected via a Bridge (clique with 3 vertices)



#### Case 3: Top two preference of E and F among remaining same



Case 3: Top two preference of E and F among remaining same





Possible extensions of this structure

Adding more edges to a tree, particularly leaf sibling edge to a binary tree



#### Structures

- Cycles(length: 5, 6)
- Cliques connected via a Bridge (clique with 3 vertices)
- Other Miscellaneous Structures

#### Other Miscellaneous structures



#### What's Next?

#### Possible Future Directions:

- General algorithm for  $C_n$  For cycle networks, we have algorithms upto  $C_6$ .
- *Extensions to* [BQZ17] Our extension only added 1 edge. We have an algorithm for adding leaf edges, but it involves wastage.
- Limitations of continuous procedures It isn't known how far these processes can bring us in obtaining efficient algorithms. We can try finding discrete algorithms, but even for simpler structures like  $C_4$ , they have the possibility of being very complicated.
- Other fairness notions Proportionality is generally easier to obtain than envy-freeness, but is harder to generalize over several networks. Nevertheless, we can try to obtain proportional and efficient algorithms. We can also try to define and study other notions of networked fairness.

#### **Our References**

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# Thank you!

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